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I.
A.

ARGUMENT

COYLE INCORRECTLY STATES THE STANDARD OF REVIEW.
Instead of addressing each of WVC's Issues for Review, Coyle provides an

overall "Standard of Review" and contends WVC's arguments A, B, C, D, E, and G
involve applying facts to law and for these arguments the Commission's Decision is
subject to a reasonableness/rationality review standard. Coyle's Brf., pp.v-vi (citing
Ogden City Corp. v. Harmon, 2005 UT App 274, 19, 116 P.3d 973 (citation omitted) and
Salt Lake City Corp. v. Salt Lake City Civil Serv. Comm 'n, 2006 UT App. 47). He also
states argument F "involves factual determinations" and should be reviewed under a
clearly erroneous standard. This is overly simplistic.
First, Coyle is incorrect in suggesting each issue is separate and distinct and can be
divorced from the amalgam of situations inherent in an appeal such as this.
Second, Coyle's assumption ignores basic law such as: (1) hearsay is admissible
in Commission hearings; (2) hearsay is an exception under rules such as Utah R. Evid.
801,803,804, 807; (3) the relative burdens of proof, including the employee must show
discipline imposed is improper; (4) the Commission must give deference to the Chiefs
choice of discipline; (5) due process applies to WVC and not just Coyle, and a
Commission exceeds its authority when it fails to provide due process; (6) a party's not
having an opportunity to cross-examine witnesses does not necessarily violate due
process. Further, the standard for review for the Commission's first question, i.e., "do the
facts support the charges made by the department head," is "substantial evidence"
''viewed in light of the whole record" before the appellate court. Lucas v. Murray Civil
1

Serv. Comm 'n, 949 P.2d 746, 758 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). That "substantial" evidence
must be relevant and competent, and evidence is "'not substantial if overwhelmed by
other evidence or based on mere conclusion."' Id. (citation omitted).
Furthermore, a "residuum" of evidence is not as narrow as Coyle suggests. This
Court recognizes "hearsay can constitute legally competent evidence." Prosper v.
Department of Workforce Servs., 2007 UT App 81, ,Il 1, 68 P.3d 344. This residuum can
be based on admissible hearsay, which means even hearsay is permitted since the
standard is only it "cannot be based exclusively on inadmissible hearsay." Id. (emphasis
added)(citation omitted). Further, "if an out of court statement is offered for some other
purpose-e.g., to prove that it was made and not for its truth-it is not hearsay." Id.; see
also id. '1{13 n.4 ("[employer] offered evidence of customer complaints about [employee]
not to establish the truth of any particular complaint, but [] to show she was the object of
numerous customer complaints and thus an employee who did not perform
satisfactorily"). WVC took this position in the Commission hearing, i.e., argued
statements were admissible to show they were made about Coyle and thus were part of
the Chiefs consideration, and not necessarily for their truth but instead as part of
opinions of others, and also the residual rule of Utah R. Evid. 807 applies. See R.12953001 (Commission sustains Coyle's objection to Powell's testimony about comments
made to him by WVC residents); 1374; 1422 (testimony shows "decision factor"); 144648; 1530-31 & -34 (Commission refuses to allow Chief Marx to refer to predisciplinary/
disciplinary transcripts despite his saying he relied on both when making discipline
decision for Coyle); 1545; 1564 (sustaining objection to Chief Marx's testimony other
2

officers lost confidence in Coyle); 1566-67 (sustaining objection to Chief Marx's
discussing DA's dismissal of cases).
B.

COYLE INCORRECTLY IDENTIFIED THE "GRAVAMEN OF TIDS

APPEAL."
Coyle contends the "gravamen" of this appeal is only whether "the charges
warrant the sanction imposed," inasmuch as he already admits committing "two policy
violations." Coyle Brf., p.vi. This is incorrect. Chief Marx relied on more than two
policy violations plus what he concluded was "[Coyle's] failure to take personal
responsibility'' (R.4-5), and the Commission's Decision addressed at least four policy
violations. (R.1842-46). WVC's appeal addresses all of those violations as well as Chief
Marx's conclusion Coyle, the lieutenant in charge, failed to accept responsibility. This
means despite Coyle' s admitting two policy violations, when assessing whether "the facts
support the charges," this appeal must involve all policy violations plus Coyle's failure to
accept responsibility during the predisciplinary meeting. See In re Discharge ofJones,
720 P.2d 1356, 1361 (Utah 1986).

C.

COYLE'S OVERALL ARGUMENTS SHOW REVERSAL IS
WARRANTED.

Coyle makes numerous arguments why the Commission should be affirmed, but
these actually illustrate why the Commission should be reversed. For example, in
addition to arguments below, this Court would have to make several invalid assumptions
and/or reach invalid conclusions including the following.
First, this Court would have to disregard the Commission is required to give
deference to Chief Marx's decision inasmuch as "he is in a position to balance the
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competing concerns." Perez v. South Jordan, 2014 UT App 31, ,I25, 320 P.3d 42. The
Commission's lack of deferral is verified by Coyle's acknowledgment in his brief that
"[granted], someone else may have reached a different conclusion" on discipline than the
Commission did. See Coyle' s Brf. p.28. Chief Marx did reach a different conclusion, but
the Commission reversed that disciplinary decision even though it was required to give
deference to ChiefMarx's judgment there.
Second, this Court would have to accept the Commission did not abuse or exceed
its authority when it downgraded to "technical" (or what Coyle calls "minor" (Coyle's
Brf. p.28)) what the Commission had already found were violations of chain of custody,
BlueTeam, and the change issue. Add to this, even though the Commission found a
violation of the change issue, it then inexplicably chose to disregard that and stated there
was no violation.
Third, the Court would have to remove from the discipline equation any reliance
by Chief Marx on violation of the Performance and Supervisory policies as well as his
conclusion that Coyle, as lieutenant, failed to accept responsibility. This is because the
Commission apparently disregarded those aspects of Chief Marx's decision when it
assessed discipline.
Fourth, the Court would have to disregard Chief Marx's finding Coyle, the
lieutenant in charge, not only failed to accept responsibility but he instead sought to shift
blame: (1) to the sergeant he supervises; (2) to detectives he is charged with overseeing;
(3) to his superiors; (4) by saying "that's the way it's always been done"; (5) to Det.
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Frausto who was the "asset seizure specialist" despite the fact Det. Frausto raised the
change issue with Coyle. R.653-54.
Fifth, the Court would have to agree violations are mitigated based on Coyle's
claims he did not receive a job description for "lieutenant," even though Coyle already
was a lieutenant prior to his applying to head NNU.
Sixth, the Court would have to agree Coyle and Sgt. Johnson are similarly
situated, even though Coyle was NNU lieutenant, was lieutenant in Patrol before heading
NNU, and first assumed a sergeant supervisory position in 2006, whereas Sgt. Johnson
was never a lieutenant and had been in a sergeant supervisory position only since 2011.
Seventh, the Court would have to disregard that every detective in NNU received
individual discipline for the chain of custody and change issues, and Chief Marx stated in
those decisions that the "standards" had been "set by supervisors."
Eighth, the Court would have to accept that every NNU detective could be
disciplined because his/her conduct on the chain of custody and change issues brought
discredit to NNU and loss of public confidence in WVCPD ( as stated in the Letters of
Counsel), but Coyle cannot be so disciplined because the Commission allegedly found no
"causation" those violations brought discredit to NNU or loss of public confidence.
Ninth, the Court would have to determine it could not have impacted NNU
detectives' morale when every one of them was disciplined because ofCoyle's failure as
a lieutenant. The Commission failed to recognize this.

5

Tenth, this Court would have to find Assistant D.A. Anna Rossi's admissible
statements do not show D.A. Sim Gill dismissed NNU cases based on NNU's evidence
issues.
For these reasons and others discussed below, reversal is warranted 1

D.

COYLE'S DISCIPLINE WAS CONSISTENT WITH NNU'S DISBANDING.
Coyle suggests disbanding ofNNU in late 2012 was not part of the disciplinary

action and was not an issue at the hearing. Coyle's Brf. p.vii. To the contrary, the
disbanding itself and that every member of NNU was investigated and then disciplined,
cannot be ignored when considering Coyle's discipline since he bore ultimate
responsibility for NNU. This also is consistent with Chief Marx's finding and hearing
testimony Coyle did not accept responsibility during the predisciplinary meeting.
R.1558-59.
Coyle also attempts in this context to minimize discipline ofNNU's members by
stating that with one exception, NNU detectives "received only letters of discipline." Id.
However, any discipline is significant, and Chief Marx chose to discipline all NNU
detectives even though PSRB recommended discipline only for Det. Cowley (termination
recommended) and Franco (termination and/or forty hours unpaid suspension). Coyle's
Brf. pp.21-22 (citing R.870-71; 872; 874; 876-878; 880). Moreover, Letters of Counsel

issued to NNU detectives found violations of the change and chain of custody issues,
state these violations brought discredit to WVCPD and loss of public confidence, and

1From

this point, WVC's arguments attempt to address in general order those presented
in Coyle' s brief.
6

state the violations were done at supervisors' direction. See City's Init. Brf. pp.27-28. In
short, the Letters identify a higher violation, i.e., supervisory failure.
Further, Coyle's statement that IA13-008 found "only minor problems in the unit"
is misleading. Id. p.xiv. IA13-008 found widespread policy violations as well as
identifying a failure to supervise by Coyle, including that NNU detectives distrusted him
and did not respect him. City's Init. Brf., pp.14-17. These opinions by detectives and the
widespread violations led to an additional investigation, IA13-0016, which was the
supervisory investigation. What is particularly significant on appeal is that Chief Marx
testified he relied on all these reports and investigative transcripts in making his decision.

Id. p.23 (citingR.1527-1631; 1530-31, 1534).

E.

COYLE IMPROPERLY MINIMIZES CHAIN OF CUSTODY
VIOLATIONS.
Coyle attempts to diminish the impact/significance of the chain of custody

violations by terming these as "failure to fill out supplemental reports." See, e.g., Coyle's
Brf. p.vii. However, the failure here is widespread breaks in chain of custody, not just
paperwork problems. Coyle' s rephrasing this as "failure to fill out" supplemental forms
simply underscores his failure to take responsibility. In fact, Chief Marx testified what
this violation amounted to was Coyle' s failure to ensure his detectives were handling and
booking evidence correctly. R.1553-54.
The law is clear: "Before a physical object or substance connected with the
commission of a crime is admissible in evidence there must be a showing the proposed
exhibit is in substantially the same condition as at the time of the crime." State v. Torres,
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2003 UT App 114, ,I8, 69 P.3d 314 (internal quotation marks omitted (citations omitted)).
If the exhibit has been changed or altered, the trial court can refuse to admit it. Id. Here,
there is a gap in custody between the detective first receiving evidence, and the evidence
officer who stores it. Although weak links go to the weight of the evidence once
admitted (id. ,I9), this gap amounts to no link to the point that defendants could challenge
even admissibility of such evidence. In short, "failure to fill out supplemental reports"
glosses over evidence handling failures. See, e.g., City's Init. Brf. p.33 (Powell's
testimony on chain of custody problems).

F.

COYLE LOSES CREDIBILITY BY ARGUING LACK OF TRAINING.
Coyle attempts to excuse his failures by contending he lacked training/schooling.

Coyle's Brf. p.x. This only confirms it was appropriate to remove him from a
supervisory position. Coyle became a sergeant in 2006, and then was lieutenant in Patrol
for eighteen months before becoming NNU lieutenant. Id. For him to contend he did not
know a lieutenant's job description is disingenuous since an officer who is supervisor
material should be able to determine what information is needed, including a job
description, and locate it himself. Coyle apparently could not.

G.

THE COMMISSION DID NOT ADDRESS ALL POLICY VIOLATIONS.
The Court should reject Coyle's argument that the Commission actually did make

findings of fact as to his violation of WV CPD Policy 300.5 (Supervisor Responsibility).
Coyle' s Brf. p. l. The Commission did not do this. Coyle contends this was "discussed"
in the Commission's Decision at R.1844-45 (,Il2) and R.1848 (Commission's Analysis,
Section II). Id. However, the Commission's Decision at R.1844-45 states supervisors
8

"did not clarify the change in policy'' and "did not verify compliance" by NNU. R.184445, ,r,ri-j. These statements suggest either there was no Policy 300.5 violation, or it is
ambiguous. Furthermore, this section of the Commission's Decision involves only
BlueTeam software, whereas Chief Marx also found Supervisor Responsibility
failure/violation in the chain of custody issue. See City's Init. Brf. p.8 (citing R.4-5). In
light of this and contrary to Coyle' s contention, the Harmon case does apply here since
the Commission failed to make findings of fact on Policy 300.5. See Ogden City Corp. v.

Harmon, 2005 UT App 274, ,r14, 116 P.3d 973.
As for WVCPD Policy 340.3.5 (Performance), Coyle is incorrect when he
contends the heading of,r13 of the Commission's Decision is a conclusion as to
Performance. This heading simply restates Chief Marx's allegation against Coyle, and is
not a conclusion by the Commission. See Coyle's Brf. p.3. Indeed, statements under this
heading include the Commission's justifications that Coyle received no training, and also
attempt to lay fault on Coyle's supervisors. See R.1845. Significantly, since the
Commission's Decision's Conclusion does not list Performance as being violated, the
Commission must not have deemed it a violation although it clearly was.
With regard to the caption of Section II of the Commission's Decision, it says one
thing and then concludes something different. Although the heading states "Sufficient
Evidence Exists to Support the Allegation that Lt. Coyle Violated [WVCPD] Policy
804.3 Property Handling," the Commission's analysis then goes on to state Coyle did not
violate Policy 804.3 as to seized vehicles. Moreover, the analysis is ambiguous about
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whether the Commission felt Coyle violated Policy 804.3 as to chain of custody. R.184748.
As for Supervisory violation, Supervisor Responsibility is discussed in the
Commission's Decision only in connection with BlueTeam. See R.1847-49. The
Commission also should have discussed it in connection with chain of custody.
Finally, the reality is that whether there is a violation of Performance is not stated
in the Commission's Decision. R.1853-54. Even though Coyle contends it is listed
inasmuch as "failure of performance" is stated in the caption of the Commission's
Decision at 'lfl3, as WVC points out above, that caption simply restates Chief Marx's
allegation and is not the Commission's conclusion. See R.1845. Indeed, Coyle even
admits the Commission did not separately analyze Performance. Coyle's Brf. p.4.
In sum, the Commission's Decision fails to make specific findings on several
violations that were part of Chief Marx's decision, such as Supervisory failure as to chain
of custody, and Performance.

H.

THE COMMISSION ERRED IN EVIDENTIARY RULINGS.

1.

Protected Exhibits Were Proffered, and The Record Cannot Be
Disregarded.

Coyle argues: (1) WVC's not objecting to a protective order over certain exhibits
means the Commission could prohibit Chief Marx from testifying about matters in those
exhibits and WVC was required to direct the Commission to specific parts of those
exhibits (by proffer) ifit wanted the Commission to consider them; and (2) testimony
about Coyle's playing video games at work/working fewer hours than claimed is
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irrelevant because that alleged misconduct was not contained in the Notice of
Disciplinary Decision. Coyle's Brf. p.5. These arguments should be rejected.
The Commission must consider the entire record whether a proffer is made or not,
and the protected exhibits were admitted as evidence and were part of the record. Coyle
even agrees the Commission denied his motion to exclude this evidence. Coyle Brf. p.6.
Thus, the exhibits were before the Commission and part of the record whether or not
proffered. Moreover, WVC did proffer all of these exhibits by stating in written proffer:
At the close of evidence, the Commission asked both parties to proffer any
further evidence from the exhibits under "protective order" in writing ...
Pursuant to the CSC's ruling that Exhibits 11-18 and 21 were submitted as
evidence, they should be reviewed, in camera, in their entirety.
R.91 (emphasis added). As for specifically proffering, WVC did make specific proffer as
to Coyle's admissions as to the failure to follow policy regarding the BlueTeam software,
the property and evidence booking, and retaining items from forfeited vehicles. R.155657.

In addition, NNU detectives' statements about Coyle not working 40 hours per
week/playing video games is relevant. Policy 340.3.5 (Performance) states:
Any ... conduct which any employee knows or reasonably should know is
unbecoming an employee of the Department or which is contrary to good
order, efficiency or morale or which tends to reflect unfavorably upon the
Department or its members.
R.253 (emphasis added). Coyle's conduct impacted morale, and NNU Det. Salmon even
stated in IA-13008 that Coyle had "no business being a lieutenant or a sergeant and very
frankly ah [sic] I don't think he should be a police officer." R.836. Other NNU
detectives told the IA-13008 investigator Coyle kept skiis in his police vehicle, was
11

untruthful about hours worked, and lied about his whereabouts. R.608-09, 836-38, 18182, 1276. In this context, in the disciplinary decision Chief Marx states Coyle failed as a
"mentor, guide and trainer." R.7. Chief Marx also testified each and every NNU
detective was frustrated and demoralized. R.1563. He also testified he found this
because "the NNU had become a dysfunctional unit with a complete breakdown in good
order and functionality." R.123. These findings were illustrated/substantiated by NNU
detectives' negative opinion of Coyle as a supervisor, and although the Commission did
not allow Chief Marx to testify about detectives' statements, he did testify he relied on
everything in the exhibits (R.1529-31), and all exhibits were proffered.

2.

The Commission Made Repeated Improper Hearsay Rulings.

Coyle gives several reasons why he believes the Commission did not err in
hearsay rulings. These are without merit.
First, Coyle's contention that WVC should have made a presumably verbal proffer
of testimony illustrates the difficulty WVC faced in presenting its case. WVC could not
refer to anything in the protected but admitted exhibits, so it was impossible to verbally
proffer testimony. Further, proffer typically goes to admissibility but the exhibits already
had been admitted.
Second, for the same reason, the Court should reject Coyle's contention that three
instances cited by WVC should be disregarded because WVC "did not create a record by
proffering the testimony it believes would be elicited." Coyle's Brf. p.8. In those three
instances the information that would be elicited was reflected in the question asked by
WVC, then was objected to as hearsay by Coyle, and finally was ruled inadmissible
12

hearsay by the Commission. Id. For example, the question to D.C. Powell ("example of .
. . without giving person's name ... one thing that stands out in your mind"), was
preceded by a general explanation of the community's phone calls and comments to D.C.
Powell expressing their concerns, frustrations and anger with WVCPD. R.1293-94.
However, when D.C. Powell was asked for a specific example, Coyle objected on
hearsay grounds and said "if they're going to rely on this ... they need to have [citizens]
in here." R.1295. Commissioner Attridge then spoke up and said the three
Commissioners all lived in WVC and knew what was being said so the testimony isn't
"out of time." Id. Coyle's lawyer then stated the Commissioners should recuse "if ...
you already have an idea." Id. After subsequent lengthy discussion by Coyle of how the
Commissioners were prejudiced, followed by a recess, the Commissioners sustained the
hearsay objection. R.1295-302.
In the second incident Chief Russo was not allowed to testify about what his
officers had told him about how they felt about the "scandal." R.1420-21. Coyle's
lawyer objected and, knowing NNU officers would assert Fifth Amendment rights,
blithely said:
Why doesn't he bring in some of the officers from the narcotics unit and
ask them. I say that facetiously or half facetiously.
R.1420. After this WVC reminded the Commission they could admit hearsay which
would go to weight, and that this evidence to be elicited did not go to the truth of the
matter asserted but "it's just one of the things that [Chief Marx] would consider ... when
he made his decision." R.1421-22. Despite this, the Commission sustained the objection,
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and then later stated in the ruling they would not consider how WVCPD officers felt.
R.1422-23, R.1850.
In the third situation which involved the Commission's ruling that it was
prohibited hearsay, Chief Marx was not allowed to testify he had concluded officers lost
confidence in Coyle. Coyle argues no foundation was laid, and contends the foundation
that should have been laid is "who [Chief Marx] talked with, when he talked to them,
what he said, what they said." R.1564-65. However, Coyle knew the Commission would
not allow NNU officers to be named, or their testimony in the exhibits to be presented in
hearing. The result was a Catch-22 for WVC, i.e., it had been ordered not to discuss this
foundation, but then was punished when it could not do so.

I.

THE COMMISSION FAILED TO ADDRESS ALL REASONS FOR
DEMOTION.

It is undisputed that the Commission failed to consider Coyle's failure to take
personal responsibility. Coyle excuses this by contending Chief Marx did not cite this as
a reason for discipline. Coyle's Brf. p.10. This is incorrect. "Performance" clearly is
cited as a reason for discipline and part of Chief Marx's decision is Coyle failed as a
"mentor, guide and trainer." R.7. Coyle waives aside Coyle's failure to accept
responsibility by stating Chief Marx explained why he wrote the "failure to take
responsibility" paragraph but "importantly [he] did not testify that it was a basis for his
decision or constituted a policy violation on the part of Lt. Coyle." Coyle's Brf. p.11.
This is disingenuous. Chief Marx's testimony on the relevant pages shows the demotion
decision was being discussed, including "leadership is an honor and privilege. It comes
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with great responsibility'' and he felt Coyle did not meet that responsibility. R.1557-58.
There also is no merit to Coyle' s attempt to equate this to Salt Lake City Corp. v. Salt

Lake City Civil Serv. Comm 'n, 2006 UT App 47, where the police chief did not
specifically mention processing/ distribution of peyote. F allure of responsibility, failure
of leadership, and failure to train and mentor are all specifically stated in Chief Marx's
Decision. For the Commission to ignore Chief Marx's concluding paragraph dealing
with failure to take responsibility was to ignore his reasoning and discretion on why
demotion to a non-supervisory position was appropriate.
Finally, Coyle argues he actually did take responsibility. Coyle's Brf. p.11.
However, Chief Marx obviously would not agree and there is evidence of why he would
not agree. For example, in the predisciplinary meeting with Chief Marx, Coyle attempted
to excuse his actions by saying no one ever told him that change in seized vehicles should
be booked into evidence, and also excused himself by saying Det. Frausto was the asset
seizure specialist. R.1721. It also is significant that Chief Marx testified he did not think
in the predisciplinary hearing that Coyle "grasp[ ed] the concern" about the dismissal of
felony cases. R.1542; see also City's Init. Brf. p.20 (excuses given by Coyle in
-i;;

predisciplinary hearing).
Finally, what Coyle calls his allegedly "straightforward and responsible"
testimony at the Commission hearing is irrelevant. See Coyle's Brf. p.12. The factor for
the Commission to assess was how Chief Marx viewed Coyle's demeanor and acceptance
of responsibility, etc., when Chief Marx was making his decision. If the Commission
was swayed by and/or relied on after-the-fact change of demeanor or its own perceived
15

acceptance of responsibility by Coyle during the Commission hearing, it exceeded its
authority and abused its discretion.
J.

IT WAS ERROR TO DISREGARD DISMISSAL OF FELONY CASES.

Coyle contends it was proper for the Commission to refuse to consider D .A. Sim
Gill's dismissal of dozens ofNNU cases, giving as his reason there was no evidence
dismissals were due to NNU's failure to properly handle evidence. Coyle's Brf. pp.1213. After stating this, however, Coyle then goes on essentially to admit that everyone,
including the Commission, knew the cases were dismissed due to flaws caused by NNU.
Coyle's Brf. p.13.
More significantly, there was unchallenged testimony that dismissals were due to
chain of custody, but the Commission disregarded this. For example: (1) DC Powell
testified "[t]here were a large number of cases that were dismissed at the [D .A.' s] Office.
And the [WVC] Prosecutor's Office cited there were concerns over chain of custody as it
pertained to evidentiary aspects on numerous investigations" (R 1283-84); (2) Chief
Marx testified numerous felony cases were dismissed because the DA "feels that there
would be challenges in court on the custody of evidence" (R.1542) (emphasis added).
These instances alone are sufficient to show the Commission erred.
The reality is that it was Chief Marx's understanding/belief that NNU cases were
dismissed due to chain of custody problems and, due to his discretion, this justifies his
decision and provides any "link" needed. Indeed, the Commission is required to give
deference to a Chiefs disciplinary decision making.
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Finally, Coyle attempts to explain away the critical fact of his own admission that
D .A. Anna Rossi told him one of his cases had been one that was dismissed, by stating
"that case involved a suspect who had assaulted [Coyle] with a knife, and had nothing to
do with the handling of evidence." Coyle's Brf. p.14. This is blatantly incorrect.
Although Coyle was cut with a knife during the incident, the following statements by
Coyle in the predisciplinary meeting make clear dismissal of that case had to do with
handling of drug evidence by NNU, i.e., chain of custody, and also had to do with D.A.
Sim Gill's opinion that NNU' s credibility was tainted:
Marx: John, let me ask you this: was there ever any training ever given to
you or your sergeant specifically about the supposed need for a sup [sic]
report in that circumstance?
Coyle: No. No. I-I haven't received any training on it. I mean, probably
the last evidence training I received was in FTO or out at the academy. . ..
it's coincidental that ... DA Anna Rossi called me this morning. I don't
know if you recall the - the fight I had down in Chesterfield where I got
stabbed in the hand, the guy I fought with. I got in a fight when we -as the
narcotics unit, we made contact at Larry Miller's trailer.... A guy tried to
flush an ounce ofdope. I got in a fight with him, he swung a knife at me a
couple of times, cut my hand. . . . Anyway, long story shorter, we went to a
prelim. The guy was bound over. He was sent to California because he
was wanted on several NCIC warrants out of California for weapons
violations and drug violations. We went through the prelim. Anna called
me up this morning, coincidentally.... [S]he said, "Hey, I just wanted to
let you know, I feel horrible. You know that that case was dismissed---one
ofthe cases that was dismissed, correct?" And I said, ''No, I did not know
that, but thank you for telling me." And she said, "I wanted to let you
know that you did excellent work on it. I had no problems with anything in
that report. Your report was excellent. Your testimony was excellent. It
was a great case." She even said ... ["]I was pissed off when I found out
that it was dismissed myself.["] And you know, that' s---we handled
evidence in that case, and she had no issues with any evidence or anything
that we did in that case.
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R.428-29. Coyle's statement about that case being "one of the cases that was dismissed"
by D.A. Sim Gill is significant, particularly since those involved included Coyle, Salmon
and other NNU detectives, and the case involved drug evidence. Assistant D.A. Rossi
did not dismiss the case-D.A. Sim Gill did-and it was one of the dozens he dismissed.
This shows there were dismissals because of a perceived taint by NNU' s involvement,
which goes directly to the chain of custody and credibility issues. Accordingly, based on
this admission about a NNU case involving "dope" being one of "the cases" dismissed,
the Commission erred in finding no link. This is even more significant combined with
Coyle's hearing testimony that he was aware that dismissed felony cases involved NNU
members, and his lawyer's statement in closing argument that the DA dismissed the cases
based on credibility ofNNU officers. R.1759-60, 1793.

K.

COYLE MISCONSTRUES THE CHANGE ISSUE.
The Decision explicitly states "the Commission determines that [Coyle] did not

violate WV CPD Policy 804.3 Property Handling as it relates to the cleaning out of seized
vehicles." R.1849. Coyle now contends WVC misreads the Decision, and the
Commission did not reach that decision. Coyle's Brf. p.15. However, the Decision states
what it states.
Alternatively, Coyle contends the Commission reached the same decision as WVC
with regard to the change issue, i.e., Coyle was exonerated and that issue cannot be
charged against him. Coyle's Brf. pp.16-17. Again, Coyle misreads the Decision. Even
IAB-008, which dealt with Coyle's personal responsibility, found he personally violated
the Policy. See R.215-223 at 219. In this context, Coyle also argues it makes no sense to
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find there was a failure of supervision regarding the change issue when "the PSRB, the
Department and the City concluded [in IA13-008] there was no wrongdoing by [Coyle]
or anyone else" regarding handling loose change. Coyle's Brf. p.18. Again, Coyle
misunderstands because NNU detectives were disciplined in IA13-008 for
personal/individual responsibility in the change issue. They received Letters of Counsel

in part for the change issue, and that discipline might have been harsher but for
recognition their actions were done at supervisors' direction. See Lund (R.26-64); Smith
(R.1118-20); Frausto (R.264-66); McCarthy (R.267-68); Franco (R.269-73).
As for Coyle' s own personal actions, in a clarification to Chief Marx, Lt. Merritt

..;;

.

confirmed Coyle personally was one of those taking money from seized vehicles.
R.1019-20. Chief Marx sustained the allegation of Coyle' s collecting money and not
booking it into evidence. R.4. Chief Marx further stated the sustained conduct
(including change issue) "falls below the standard of excellence we expect our
supervisors to display. By participating in the above conduct you have displayed a casual
disregard for WVCPD policy and the responsibility of a supervisor which will not be
tolerated." R. 7.

L.

IT WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION TO DEEM VIOLATIONS
TECHNICAL.
WVC contends the Commission abused its discretion when it deemed violations as

"technical," thereby minimizing acts it acknowledges occurred. Coyle disagrees, but his
reasoning is without merit.
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First, Coyle contends WVC's argument is inconsistent because "on one hand it
contends the Commission first decided the violations were technical and this distorted
how it interpreted the facts pertaining to the misconduct," and on the other hand "[WVC]
contends the Commission misinterpreted the facts to conclude the violations were
'technical."' Coyle' s Brf. p.19. This is incorrect. WVC contends the Commission found
the facts supported the charges, but the Commission then concluded the facts/charges
were "no big deal" for reasons arrived at wholly by the Commission.
For example, WVC contends the Commission went outside its authority and
rationalized away obvious chain of custody violation(s) by stating there is no evidence
dismissal of cases by the D.A. (and WVC prosecutor) was due to chain of custody
concerns, and there was no evidence NNU was keeping trophies. The Commission's
trophy excuse is puzzling since "trophy keeping" was not alleged by Chief Marx. As for
chain of custody, the Commission minimized this by deciding Coyle was only negligent.
However, when every NNU detective receives a Letter of Counsel for chain of custody
violations, the lieutenant in charge cannot have been only negligent and therefore
blameless. The same is true for minimizing as "technical" the admitted BlueTeam
Software violations, where Coyle claimed this was not his job. Even the Commission
found Coyle allowed NNU to improperly document uses of force contrary to policy. See
R.1848.
Second, even assuming the Commission could minimize admitted violations, the
reasons given by the Commission are not supported by the facts. A lieutenant cannot be
only negligent when there is wholesale violation of chain of custody by detectives under
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his command and he thinks this is alright. Coyle' s attempt to roinimi ze this is
reminiscent of Harmon, where the Ogden Civil Service Commission chose not even to
consider the "zucchini" incident because it found the victim's discussion with the
supervisor who made this remark was consensual, the victim laughed, and it was an
isolated incident. Harmon, 2005 UT App 274, ,rs. However, in Harmon, the
Commission at least was candid enough to find the facts did not support the charges
based on the victim's alleged consent. By contrast, the Commission here agrees there
was violation but then minimizes it before reaching the proportionality analysis.
Furthermore, the Commission here used faulty evidentiary rulings to minimize the facts,

e.g., stating there was no evidence the dismissed cases were due to chain of custody and
refusing to find public displease based on the fact no citizen actually appeared to testify
about public displeasure with WVCPD.
Third, Coyle argues WVC has a "stiff burden to successfully challenge" factual
findings and WVC had to marshal the evidence. Coyle's Brf. p.21. WVC did marshal
the evidence, and the Commission confirmed Chief Marx's factual conclusions by
agreeing all incidents occurred. Coyle also contends he was only negligent in the chain
of custody issue and the standard is what a reasonable and prudent person would have
done under the circumstances. Coyle's Brf. pp.22-23. However, in the predisciplinary
meeting with Chief Marx, Coyle stated he saw no problem with the property booking
method and a DA/prosecutor/superior should have said something to him about it.
R.422-28. If Coyle as a police professional and supervisor saw no problem with the
booking method, he was not simply negligent. It also is significant that much ofCoyle's
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argument goes to how it was not his fault this occurred, and instead was Sgt. Johnson's
fault. Coyle's Brf. pp.21-23. This further illustrates why Chief Marx found Coyle did
not take responsibility.
Fourth, Coyle contends it was West Valley City's burden to show the misconduct
occurred, and also "demotion was the proper discipline." Coyle's Brf. p.21 n.20. This is
incorrect. It is Coyle's burden to show discipline is "disproportionate to the offense(s)."

Huemiller v. Ogden Civil Serv. Comm 'n, 2004 UT App 375, ,I6, 101 P.3d 394. To do
this, Coyle can attempt to show demotion is not within the range of sanctions allowed, or
is not proportional, or there is a '"meaningful disparity of treatment between [him]self
and other similarly situated employees."' Id. (quoting Kelly v. Salt Lake City Civil Serv.

Comm 'n, 2000 UT App 235, ,I30, 8 P.3d 1048); Nelson v. Orem City, 2012 UT App 147,
,I20 & 127 n.6, 278 P.3d 1089. The Commission erred here since it placed a burden on
WVC, stating "the City provided no evidence that other supervisors in similar situations
were similarly disciplined." R.1849-53. This alone is sufficient to reverse the
Commission's decision.
Fifth, Coyle argues that in 2012 and 2013 "WVPD was undoubtedly under
considerable scrutiny" so nothing should be "blamed" on Coyle. Coyle's Brf. p.24. This
appears to be what the Commission thought, and it abused its discretion when it referred
to "technical" violations not being significant in light of the "heightened scrutiny that
WVCPD and the NNU were under due to the unsubstantiated allegations of more serious
violations." R.1850. However, the Commission has no authority to refer to the
environment in which Coyle's violations were uncovered. Indeed, this amounts to the
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Commission's including all of Det. Cowley's original allegations, many unfounded, and
then stating everything-including things Chief Marx never considered-showed
discipline was excessive. Moreover, it ignores Chief Marx's testimony that "if [Coyle]
had been a very capable and very good supervisor we would not be here today," and
would not have had the problems that resulted from Coyle's failures, or a breakdown and
dysfunction in NNU. R.1561.
Sixth, Coyle contends it is "pure speculation" that failure to document uses of
force on BlueTeam might cause problems for WVCPD in the future. Coyle's Brf. p.25.
However, this obviously is short-sighted.
Finally, in discussing why BlueTeam is a "technical" violation, Coyle only
reiterates it was Sgt. Johnson's fault. Coyle's Br£ pp.25-26. Again, the reason Chief
Marx believed Coyle failed to accept responsibility.

M.
~

THE CO:Ml\11SSION'S DECISION ON DISCIPLINE SHOULD BE
REVERSED.
Coyle argues the Commission did not err when it determined the disciplinary

decision of Chief Marx was neither proportional nor consistent. Coyle's Brf. pp.26-32.
This argument should be rejected, and the Commission abused its discretion as well as
exceeded its authority.

1.

Proportionality

Regarding proportionality, Coyle is incorrect when he argues the Hannon factors
were not met, whether by violations found by Chief Marx or those found by the
Commission. See Harmon, 2005 UT App 274, ,I18.
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First, all violations found by Chief Marx as well as by the Commission related to
Coyle's official duties and impeded his ability to perform those duties. His failure to
supervise alone meets this test.
Second, Coyle' s failure to require proper chain of custody alone is of a type that
adversely affects public confidence in NNU. Evidence is critical in police work
involving narcotics, yet Coyle's attitude about chain of custody was cavalier.
Third, Coyle' s failure to require proper chain of custody and deal with the change
issue, alone, undermined the morale and effectiveness ofNNU. This is true if only
because every detective was disciplined because of Coyle 's supervisory and leadership
failure. The record also shows NNU detectives had little regard for Coyle' s leadership,
did not think he worked his required hours, thought he played video games at work, and
even thought Coyle should not be in police work. See R.181-82, 529-50, 604, 607-09,
640, 644-46, 709, 746-47, 749-52, 817, 836-38, 841-42, 10-43-46, 1273-76.
Fourth, Coyle was more than negligent. Coyle knew about violations yet did
nothing, including that his Supervisory and Performance violations clearly were knowing.
For example, Det. Frausto raised the change issue but Coyle did nothing, and Coyle
admits he could have corrected the chain of custody problem yet he did not.
Finally, Coyle's suggestion the Commission found there was no "dishonor to
WV CPD" or "undermin[ing] [of] the public trust" because the violations were minor in
light of the "unsubstantiated allegations of more serious violations," confirms the
Commission abused its discretion and exceeded its authority. This suggests the
Commission looked at Det. Cowley's allegations and since not all of those were verified
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or found valid in Lt. Merritt's investigation, this meant Chief Marx should have given a
lesser discipline. However, the Commission had no authority to go back and look at Det.
Cowley's allegations. It had authority only to assess the violations that were found valid
and used by Chief Marx as the basis for discipline. The Commission clearly was outside
its authority if it assessed discipline in this way.

2.

Consistency

Although Coyle mentions other NNU detectives in his consistency argument, he
does not appear to seriously believe they are similarly situated to Coyle despite the fact
the Commission compared them to Coyle in its Decision. It is appropriate to give the
Commission's comparison here short shrift because NNU detectives are not similarly
situated to Coyle, except insofar as they were disciplined because of Coyle's supervisory
failures. Coyle does suggest that the fact that detectives, Sgt. Johnson, and Coyle were
investigated in IA13-008 means they are similarly situated. However, the investigation
that was the basis for Coyle's discipline is IA13-016, and NNU detectives had no part in
that. The Commission's using NNU detectives for comparison is an abuse of discretion.
Coyle focuses his consistency argument primarily on comparing Coyle' s
discipline with that of Sgt. Johnson. See Coyle's Brf. pp.30-32. He suggests Sgt.
Johnson is similarly situated because Sgt. Johnson: (1) was "primarily responsible for
seeing that evidence was properly booked into the evidence room [and documented],"
and (2) "was supposed to make the entries in BlueTeam Software and then bring the
entries to Coyle's attention." Coyle's Brf. pp.31-32. These do not make Coyle and Sgt.
Johnson similarly situated. Coyle was a lieutenant and in charge ofNNU. He also had
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been a lieutenant in Patrol for eighteen months, and before that was a sergeant starting in
2006. Sgt. Johnson had been a sergeant only since 2011. Chief Russo testified a
lieutenant is "probably the most powerful individual in [a] police department." R.1416.
As lieutenant, Coyle was Sgt. Johnson's supervisor and was responsible for regularly
auditing both Sgt. Johnson and NNU detectives. R.1845-46. Further, Chief Marx
testified: ( 1) he saw a difference in the acceptance of responsibility and the
understanding Sgt. Johnson had of "the ramifications for the events;" and (2) the higher
the rank in a police department, the greater the responsibility and accountability. R.157274. The Commission did not consider this.

II.

CONCLUSION

Based on the arguments in this brief and its initial brief, WVC respectfully asks
this Court to reverse the decision of the WVC Civil Service Commission, and to reinstate
the disciplinary decision of Chief Marx.
DATED this ~ y of September, 2014.
SNOW CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
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been a lieutenant in Patrol for eighteen months, and before that was a sergeant starting in
2006. Sgt. Johnson had been a sergeant only since 2011. Chief Russo testified a
lieutenant is "probably the most powerful individual in [a] police department." R.1416.
As lieutenant, Coyle was Sgt. Johnson's supervisor and was responsible for regularly
auditing both Sgt. Johnson and NNU detectives. R.1845-46. Further, Chief Marx
testified: ( 1) he saw a difference in the acceptance of responsibility and the
understanding Sgt. Johnson had of "the ramifications for the events;" and (2) the higher
the rank in a police department, the greater the responsibility and accountability. R.157274. The Commission did not consider this.
II.

CONCLUSION

Based on the arguments in this brief and its initial brief, WVC respectfully asks
this Court to reverse the decision of the WVC Civil Service Commission, and to reinstate
the disciplinary decision of Chief Marx.
DATED this ~ a y of January, 2015.
SNOW CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
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